

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #1098/01 3361345
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 021345Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0459
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5609
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2786
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1796
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7003

S E C R E T GENEVA 001098

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019
TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): HEADS OF DELEGATION ONE-ON-ONE MEETING,
NOVEMBER 16, 2009

REF: A. STATE 115348
[1](#)B. GENEVA 0976 (SFO-GVA-VI-037)
[1](#)C. GENEVA 0856 (SFO-GVA-V-044)
[1](#)D. GENEVA 1012 (SFO-GVA-VI-052)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-024.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: November 16, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:30 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva
Participants:

U.S.	RUSSIA
A/S Gottemoeller	Amb Antonov
Ms. Purcell	

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) On November 16, 2009, U.S. Head of Delegation (HOD), Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller, held a one-on-one meeting with Russian HOD, Ambassador Antonov, at the U.S. Mission. Antonov provided a heads-up about a directive of the Russian President to reach agreement on a number between 600-700 delivery vehicles and a possible visit by Duma members to Geneva. He insisted that the U.S.-proposed bridging agreement (REF A) was a non-starter; provisional application

was the only realistic alternative. Antonov provided new proposals for associated documents on missile defense, while seeking to retain one paragraph in the treaty text on non-conversion between offensive and defensive systems. The HODs narrowed differences in the treaty preamble, and reviewed in detail a new U.S.-proposed text for the treaty Article on Prohibitions. End summary.

¶4. (S) Subject Summary: Assessing the Presidential Meeting; Assessing Status of Treaty Negotiations; Associated Documents on Missile Defense; Removing Brackets in Preamble; Revised Article on Prohibitions; and, Not To Forget Ukraine.

ASSESSING THE
PRESIDENTIAL MEETING

¶5. (S) Gottemoeller and Antonov resumed an exchange they had begun the previous evening by telephone, conversing about the results of the November 15 meeting between Presidents Obama and Medvedev in Singapore. Antonov shared that Russian President Medvedev had provided him direction to work out agreement on a number of strategic delivery vehicles on the order of 600-700. Further, Medvedev had said that Russia did not need strict verification measures, but was ready to review U.S. proposals. The number of inspections needed to be reasonable and equal for both Parties.

¶6. (S) Antonov said he had heard that President Obama had discussed verification measures related to road-mobile

systems and telemetry with Medvedev. Medvedev had responded that such measures were unequal and had raised Russian concerns about U.S. SSBNs. Antonov insisted that a treaty could only be concluded on the basis of equality. On a lighter note, Antonov said Medvedev had proposed that some Russian Duma members travel to Geneva to meet with the delegations. It might be a nightmare, but legislators such as Margelov and Kosachev were well-informed, and a visit from them could actually be useful.

¶7. (S) Recalling what Gottemoeller had told him the preceding evening, Antonov admitted that the plan to send Russian foreign policy adviser Prikhodko and Chief of the General Staff Makarov to Washington was a blow to him. He worried it would waste the delegations' time and complicate their work in Geneva. Gottemoeller informed him that she had recommended that the senior policy-makers meet in Geneva instead, where they could keep in contact with the HODs and leading experts on both sides. This would facilitate reaching agreement. Antonov held the same view, saying all of Russia's treaty experts were in Geneva. In addition, Gottemoeller noted that Geneva was an option for treaty signature. The U.S. Government was considering three locations for treaty signature: Reykjavik, Helsinki and Geneva. Antonov also preferred Geneva, seeing no reason for the Presidents to go to Reykjavik or Helsinki to sign the treaty. He was aware of some excellent facilities for high-level visitors in the vicinity of Geneva.

ASSESSING STATUS OF
TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

¶8. (S) Antonov said he was told that the U.S.-proposed Memorandum of Agreement on Interim Measures (the bridging agreement) was not discussed by the Presidents in Singapore, but noted the confusion that had emerged in the Russian press nevertheless. Russian press were reporting that the treaty would not be finished before the end of the year and, therefore, a separate bridging agreement was necessary. Gottemoeller assured Antonov that the U.S. position on the need to complete the treaty by early December had not changed. Antonov said he had also assured his own delegation that there was no change in the target date for treaty

completion. The delegations would have to wait for the results of Prikhodko's and Makarov's visit but, in the meantime, must continue working and do everything necessary to ensure that the treaty was ready to sign on December 5. Gottemoeller concurred, and recommended sending text to the Conforming Group as soon as it was agreed.

¶9. (S) Antonov reminded Gottemoeller that the bridging agreement, as proposed by the U.S., was not possible for Russia because of the requirement for ratification by the Russian Duma. The only option was provisional application. The treaty could refer to provisional application either once or in various places. Provisional application could be for the entire treaty or just certain articles. Antonov believed this could be decided quickly at the end.

¶10. (S) Antonov requested Gottemoeller's view as to what percentage of the treaty was agreed so far, and commented

that his delegation's views on that matter were interesting. Antonov believed it was 50 percent, while Colonel Ryzhkov had said the conversion or elimination text was 80 percent agreed. Gottemoeller said she could not yet make an estimate, but the U.S. delegation was compiling a new proposed joint draft text of the treaty articles, so the Russian delegation would be able to see how much was agreed. The agreement reached on the structure of the treaty documents had resolved a significant number of brackets.

ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS
ON MISSILE DEFENSE

¶11. (S) Antonov noted that Russia had agreed to record missile defense commitments in additional documents, which must be considered second tier and not fourth tier documents.

He provided new versions of a joint statement and two unilateral statements regarding missile defense issues, as well as one paragraph that Russia still believed must be contained in the treaty text. Antonov said Moscow had gone as far as it could to compromise with the United States on this issue. They were not even recording all of their concerns about missile defense in these documents. They had agreed to move some commitments to the joint statement that properly should be in the treaty, recognizing what was politically unacceptable to the United States. Antonov requested that the documents be reported quickly to Washington, as Moscow was awaiting the U.S. response and much depended on it. He requested a careful and balanced response, saying that emotional reactions had a counterproductive effect in Moscow and slowed progress. Gottemoeller promised that the U.S. side would study the documents.

¶12. (S) Begin text (Russia-proposed treaty text):

Side Document of the Russian
November 16, 2009

Proposal of the Russian Federation on the Formulation
of Treaty Provisions on the Interrelationship between
Strategic Offensive and Strategic Defensive Arms

The Parties shall not convert and shall not use ICBM or SLBM launchers for installation of interceptor missiles, and also shall not convert and shall not use interceptor missile launchers for installation of ICBMs or SLBMs. In addition, interceptor missiles shall not be given the capabilities of ICBMs or SLBMs.

End text.

¶13. (S) Begin text (Russian-proposed joint statement):

Document of the Russian

Side

November 16, 2009

Joint Statement of the United States of America
and the Russian Federation regarding Missile Defense

In connection with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the United States of America and the Russian Federation declare the following:

- The United States of America and the Russian Federation assume the obligations under this Treaty in the context of the strategic missile defense systems which the Parties have at the time of Treaty signature;

- The United States of America and the Russian Federation express the intent to discuss the unique features that would make newly developed types of interceptor missiles distinguishable from existing ICBMs and SLBMs;

- Procedures confirming the presence of the aforementioned differences shall be subject to agreement by the Parties to the Treaty in the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

End text.

¶14. (S) Begin text (Russian-proposed unilateral statements):

Document of the Russian

Side

November 16, 2009

Statement of the Russian Federation on Missile Defense

In connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Russian Federation declares the following:

The Treaty can function and be viable only under the condition that no quantitative and qualitative increases in the capabilities of missile defense systems take place.

Accordingly, the extraordinary events mentioned in Article ((XV))1 ((XIV))2 of the Treaty also include quantitative and qualitative increases in the capabilities of missile defense systems beyond the level extant at Treaty signature.

Statement of the United States on Missile Defense

The United States of America takes note of the statement of the Russian Federation concerning the conditions under which the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms can function and be viable, as well as the extraordinary events for the termination of the Treaty.

End text.

REMOVING BRACKETS
IN PREAMBLE

¶15. (S) Antonov provided a Russian-proposed text of the treaty preamble dated November 10, 2009, which was based on informal discussions with Gottemoeller in September. The

HODs reviewed the bracketed text in the preamble. Guided by the U.S. package proposal that National Security Advisor Jones had presented in Moscow in October (REF B), Gottemoeller agreed to Russia's preamble paragraph on the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, which added the phrase, "and that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced." Antonov complained that the U.S.-proposed adjective continuing in front of interrelationship sounded very awkward in Russian. Gottemoeller undertook to search for a better sounding word. (Begin comment: The Russian language text proposes the words "existence of" in place of "continuing." End comment.)

¶16. (S) Antonov clarified Russia's objection to the U.S. preamble paragraph, "Desiring to create a mechanism for verifying compliance with the obligations under this treaty drawing on that experience." Russia believed the existence of a verification mechanism went without saying. If the United States insisted on such a paragraph, it should reflect the July 6 Presidential Joint Understanding along the lines that the verification mechanism should be simpler than in START. Gottemoeller remarked that the U.S. side had thought Russia wanted not to refer to START, so as not to give the impression that the Parties were reconstructing START. Antonov averred that he was not concerned about a reference to START and Russia was not opposed to verification mechanisms. Rather, Russia's view was that the current verification mechanism was too costly and there were too many inspections, obstructing the operations of Russian facilities. Gottemoeller replied that she had made sure that the President was informed of this Russian concern. She urged Antonov to provide alternate wording for the paragraph, based on the July 6 Presidential Joint Understanding. It would be useful to retain a reference to verification mechanisms in the preamble.

REVISED ARTICLE ON
PROHIBITIONS

¶17. (S) The HODs discussed a shortened version of the treaty Article on Prohibitions that Gottemoeller had provided to Antonov on November 13.

Begin text (U.S. proposal on a Treaty Article on Prohibitions):

U.S. Non Paper
November 13, 2009

Article (V)1 (VI)2

¶1. Except as prohibited by the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.

¶2. The Parties agree that the modernization and replacement

of their strategic offensive arms shall not involve the production, testing or deployment of nuclear weapon delivery systems of kinds other than those existing at the time of signature of this Treaty.

¶3. In the event of the emergence in the future of a new kind of arm that one Party considers could be a new kind of strategic offensive arm, including, but not limited to:

(a) ballistic missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers, or launchers of such missiles, for installation on waterborne vehicles other than submarines;

(b) launchers of ballistic or cruise missiles for emplacement on or for tethering to the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or for emplacement in or for tethering to the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such

missiles that move only in contact with the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or missiles for such launchers;

(c) systems, including missiles, for placing nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction into a fraction of an Earth orbit;

(d) ballistic missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers, that are installed in an aircraft or on its external mountings for the purpose of being launched from this aircraft;

(e) long-range nuclear ALCMs armed with two or more nuclear weapons; and

(f) aircraft that are not airplanes, or airplanes that were not initially constructed as bombers, that have a range of 8000 kilometers or more or an integrated platform area in excess of 310 square meters,

that Party shall have the right to raise the question of such an arm for consideration by the Bilateral Consultative Commission in accordance with subparagraph (c) of Article XIII of the Treaty.

((4. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload and not to conduct rapid reload.))1

((5. Each Party undertakes not to base strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of this Treaty outside its national territory.))1

((4. Strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty shall not be based outside the national territory of each Party.))2

((6. Each Party undertakes not to engage in any activities associated with strategic offensive arms at eliminated facilities, notification of the elimination of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, unless notification of a new facility at the same location has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. Strategic offensive arms and support equipment shall not be located at eliminated facilities except during their movement through such facilities and during visits of heavy bombers at such facilities. Missile tenders may be located at

eliminated facilities only for purposes not associated with strategic offensive arms.))1

((5. Each Party undertakes not to locate heavy bombers with long-range nuclear ALCMs or other nuclear armaments outside the continental portion of national territory.))2

End text.

Paragraph 1 was the same as before: allowing modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms (SOA), except where prohibited by other treaty provisions. Paragraph 2 was completely new. It would state the Parties' intent not to develop new kinds of exotic nuclear-armed strategic offensive arms (SOA). It would reassure the international community in the run-up to the NPT Review Conference that both countries remained committed to move toward denuclearization.

118. (S) Gottemoeller explained that the new paragraph 3 of the Article would express Russia's Article XII proposal that allows for new kinds of SOA to be discussed in the BCC. Antonov questioned the subparagraphs listing examples of new kinds, taken from paragraphs 8 and 10 of the earlier U.S. proposal (REF C). He argued that treaty articles should be reserved for basic concepts; such a list should be moved to the second or third tier. Gottemoeller reiterated her concern that the Parties not appear to be backsliding on commitments they had made in START.

119. (S) Gottemoeller proposed retaining the provision

banning rapid reload. The United States was concerned about creating conditions permitting rapid reload. Antonov acknowledged this logic, but argued there was no danger of rapid reload from Russia. It would make more sense for this provision to be a U.S. unilateral statement, although Russia was not proposing that.

¶20. The HODs agreed that the U.S.-proposed paragraph 5 and Russian-proposed paragraph 4 were substantively the same. Both contained a commitment not to base SOA outside national territory. Paragraph 6 was the U.S.-proposed commitment not to have SOA or support equipment at eliminated facilities, identical to paragraph 27 of Article V of START. Antonov expressed concern about the reference to support equipment, claiming it would require that all infrastructures at an eliminated facility be destroyed, including power plants, filling stations, trucks, and cabling. Gottemoeller was willing to review and simplify the paragraph. Antonov suggested moving the paragraph to the second tier.

¶21. (S) Gottemoeller questioned the need for Russia's proposed paragraph on not locating heavy bombers with nuclear armaments outside the continental portion of national territory. Antonov explained this meant not just the capability to carry nuclear armaments, but actually carrying them while flying outside national territory. He had been told that nuclear weapons had accidentally fallen off a U.S. bomber. Gottemoeller noted that the accident had occurred 40 years ago during the Cold War. Now, U.S. heavy bombers no longer routinely carried nuclear armaments. If they did so, it would be a war or major crisis requiring a higher level of readiness. Therefore, this requirement was not necessary for the treaty. Antonov suggested that both HODs consult their

military advisors further. In general, the Russian delegation would continue studying the U.S.-proposed Article on Prohibitions.

NOT TO FORGET UKRAINE

¶22. (S) Antonov asked again how Russia and the United States should handle the Joint Statement on the Expiration of START for Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Gottemoeller indicated she had sent the agreed text to Washington for approval. Antonov commented that Ukrainian President Yushchenko said during a recent campaign event that he would send a letter to Russia and the United States requesting security guarantees. The issue had become caught up in Ukraine's Presidential campaign. Russia's position was that any such talks should be held under NPT auspices. In any case, Russia could not negotiate with Ukraine during the Presidential campaign. Gottemoeller concurred, noting she had told Ukrainian official Mr. Nykonenko that discussion of security guarantees should be conducted in the context of the NPT Review Conference and should consider all the non-nuclear-weapons states (REF D). Special guarantees for Ukraine would be counterproductive.

¶23. (S) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S. Non-Paper: U.S.-proposed text for the Treaty Article on Prohibitions, dated November 13, 2009.

- Russia:

-- Document of the Russian Side: "Proposal of the Russian Federation on the Formulation of Treaty Provisions on the Interrelationship between Strategic Offensive and Strategic Defensive Arms," dated November 16, 2009;

-- Document of the Russian Side: "Joint Statement of the United States of America and the Russian Federation regarding Missile Defense," dated November 16, 2009;

-- Document of the Russian Side: "Statement of the Russian Federation on Missile Defense, and a Statement of the United States on Missile Defense;" dated November 6, 2009. and

-- Russian-proposed text of the treaty preamble, dated November 10, 2009..

¶24. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS